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PHYSICALISM AND PANENTHEISM: 
GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS 
Carl Gillett 
The sciences provide great evidence for physicalism and I argue that this is 
good news for panentheists. For I show that if physicalism is true and there 
is a providential God, then a certain kind of panentheism is plausibly true. 
But I further argue that physicalism also brings some potentially bad news 
in the metaphysical problem of showing how realized properties can be 
causally efficacious in a physicalist universe. I argue that in order to accom-
modate divine action, and be compatible with the sciences, panentheist 
positions must answer this general metaphysical question. My conclusion is 
that until such an account is formulated the promise of panentheist views 
must go unrealized, and we must go without a version of theism that may 
be fully compatible with the sciences. 
Can the actions of a providential God be fully compatible with a scientific 
view of the natural world? A diverse array of accounts defending positive 
answers to this question have recently been offered as researchers have 
moved beyond 'conflict' models of the relationship between the sciences 
and religion.' An important subsidiary issue for such accounts is whether 
divine action is compatible with 'physicalism' (PHY), very roughly the the-
sis that all the entities in space-time are microphysically composed, since 
the sciences provide powerful evidence for this doctrine. Physicalists have 
often inclined towards atheism, but intriguingly Arthur Peacocke, the bio-
chemist and theologian, has recently suggested that the truth of physical-
ism would support a particular account of divine action - so-called 'pan-en-
theist' views under which the natural world is, in some sense, a 'compo-
nent' of God.2 
In this paper my primary goal is to explore the metaphysical implica-
tions of physicalism for divine action. After providing a precise formula-
tion of physicalism, in Part 1, I shall argue that Peacocke's main contention 
is correct and that the truth of physicalism would be good news for panen-
theists. For I will show that if physicalism is true and there is a providential 
God, then a specific form of panentheism is plausibly true. The resulting 
panentheism is of a rather different kind than that defended by Peacocke 
and other panentheists in the debate over divine action, for it takes the 
properties of God that are causally efficacious in the natural world to be 
microphysically realized. I will call such a position 'physicalist panenthe-
ism'. There are some obvious theological concerns about this position, but 
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I briefly argue that it potentially has the resources to overcome them. 
Unfortunately for panentheists, in Part 2, I will argue that the truth of 
physicalism apparently brings some bad news in the shape of less pliant 
metaphysical problems. Philosophers of mind, and others, have recently 
been greatly concerned with the general metaphysical problem of how 
realized properties can be causally efficacious in a physicalist universe. For 
there are plausible skeptical arguments that if physicalism is true, then 
only microphysical properties are causally efficacious. The bad news is that 
such arguments clearly apply to physicalist panentheism. To highlight the 
severity of these difficulties, and the character of physicalist panentheism, I 
will examine how the recent panentheist accounts of divine action inde-
pendently offered by Peacocke, and Philip Clayton, cope with these con-
cerns. Although I shall argue that the latter positions fail to solve the prob-
lems, I will suggest that their focus is a promising one. 
Ultimately, there are more global implications from my arguments 
about the good and bad news for panentheism. If my arguments are cor-
rect, then physicalism implies the truth of physicalist panentheism. Given 
the powerful scientific evidence for physicalism, it therefore appears that 
physicalist panentheism must shoulder the burden of supplying a scientifi-
cally compatible account of divine action. But in order for this position to 
be successful one must answer the general metaphysical question of how 
any realized property could be causally efficacious in such a universe. The 
wider conclusions of my arguments will consequently be that until such an 
answer is successfully provided we must accept that divine action is 
incompatible with physicalism. And that, furthermore, we must go with-
out a version of theism that may be fully compatible with the sciences. 
1. Physicalism and the Goods News for Panentheism. 
Notoriously Henry VIII's desire for an heir led to the formation of the 
Church England. And it is a commonplace of our everyday lives that, in 
similar fashion, persons (and other types of individual) cause various 
effects in virtue of their properties. Although ultimately metaphorical, our 
conception of a providential, personal God embodies similar ideas, for we 
take God to cause certain natural effects in virtue of His, or Her, properties, 
for example omni-benevolence. Although it is an important metaphysical 
question how we should explicate such ideas, here I shall attempt to 
remain relatively neutral by assuming that events are the causal relata, but 
that events enter into particular causal relations in virtue of their proper-
ties. I shall therefore use the familiar framework for causation that takes 
events as the primary causal relata, but retain the commonsense idea that 
properties playa crucial role in causal relations. Furthermore, I shall apply 
this framework to divine action, following the commonsense understand-
ing of God as acting in the natural world in virtue of His or Her properties. 
Properties will loom large in our discussion and I shall therefore assume 
Sydney Shoemaker's 'causal theory of properties' (Shoemaker (1980». Under 
this theory, a property is individuated by the causal powers it potentially con-
tributes to the individuals in which it is instantiated. Every property is distin-
guished by an array of such causal powers and two properties are only dif-
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ferent if they differ in the causal powers they potentially contribute to indi-
viduals. For reasons that will become apparent below, I focus on properties I 
term 'causally efficacious', that is properties whose instantiation in an indi-
vidual actually contributes to an individual's causal powers. In addition, I use 
the term 'entity' to refer to relations, properties, events, and individuals; and 
'composition' in a similarly wide manner to refer to realization or constitu-
tion. I take one property, or individual, to be 'higher level' relative to anoth-
er property, or individual, if the latter composes the former. 
As Arthur Peacocke has emphasized, the sciences have made it plausi-
ble that the natural universe is a comprehensive compositional hierarchy 
involving 'layers' of properties and individuals. We have a great deal of 
evidence that all higher level entities are composed by lower level entities, 
which are in tum composed by still lower entities, with this chain of com-
position ultimately bottoming out with the entities of microphysics. A 
range of scientific evidence has been uncovered to support this 'layered' 
picture over the last two hundred years, but the findings that finally estab-
lished such a view were plausibly made in the last century. 
The nature of this evidence can be appreciated by focussing on the case 
of forces. At the beginning of the twentieth century, many important scien-
tists in a variety of areas were still committed to the existence of 'special' 
forces, that is physically unrealized and fundamental forces, whether chem-
ical, vital, mental, or some further kind.3 As the century proceeded, scientific 
findings made the existence of such special forces more, and more, implau-
sible. First, the development of quantum mechanical explanations of chemi-
cal phenomena put paid to the existence of special forces in chemistry. 
Second, the steadily increasing explanatory power of biochemistry, encom-
passing accounts of the operation of cells, the processes of genetic transmis-
sion, and the nature of proteins generally, undermined the existence of vital 
forces. Lastly, physiological explanations of the nervous system and neu-
rons, as well as physiological accounts of psychological disorders such as 
schizophrenia, left us with no evidence for the existence of special mental 
forces. Such evidence constitutes a powerful case that there are only four 
(possibly three) fundamental forces, all physical - the electro-magnetic, 
gravitational, and weak and strong nuclear forces. Bolstered by similar find-
ings across the sciences, we thus have evidence that these forces, with the 
other entities of physics, compose everything in the natural universe. 
This doctrine, which I earlier labeled 'physicalism' (PHY), has become 
increasingly important in philosophical debates and the prevailing consen-
sus is that we should eschew formulations of it relying upon supervenience 
relations (Horgan (1993) and Kim (1998». I shall therefore use the following 
definition focussed upon so-called 'realization' relations between properties: 
(PHY) All properties instantiated in individuals located in space-time 
are realized by, or identical to, microphysical properties; and all indi-
viduals located in space-time are constituted by, or identical to, 
microphysical individuals.4 
We should make note of a few features of PHY. First, although our focus 
will primarily be upon properties, PHY obviously also frames an impor-
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tant claim about individuals. Second, this definition is slightly narrower 
than usual, given its limitation to individuals located in space-time and the 
properties instantiated in them, but this has a number of side benefits. For 
example, the definition is compatible with the existence of numbers and 
other abstracta that are not microphysically composed, for these are plausi-
bly not located in space-time. And, for the same reason, physicalism so 
defined also does not by itself rule out the existence of a wholly non-physi-
cal, deistic God located and acting outside space-time. These features are 
apparently strengths, since one may be dubious that the sciences can reveal 
anything about entities not located in space-time. 
Obviously identity and realization are central to PHY and given our 
focus upon properties we need to be careful that we are clear about their 
natures. The conditions for the identity of properties are clear enough 
under the causal theory, but we also need an account of the realization 
relation. The core idea of realization is that a realizer property "plays the 
causal role of" the realized property where this involves an asymmetric 
dependence relation, since the "role playing" means that the realized prop-
erty depends upon the realizer property, but not vice versa. Let us thus 
define realization as follows: 
Property /relation instance(s) F1-Fn realize an instance of a property 
G, in an individual s, if and only if s has powers that are individuative 
of an instance of G in virtue of the powers contributed by F1-Fn to s 
or s's constituent(s), but not vice versa.5 
With this definition of realization in hand, we can now consider what, if 
anything, is implied by acceptance of physicalism and its 'layered' picture 
of the world. 
Peacocke claims that the sciences have made it plausible that the "causal 
nexus" of the natural world does not involve spirits, entelechies, vital 
forces, or any other 'spooky' entities, whether properties or individuals, 
that are not microphysically composed (Peacocke (1999), p.217-8). This 
putative implication of physicalism is important and I want to use our 
metaphysical machinery to explore whether it is supported. PHY states 
that all properties instantiated in individuals located in space-time are 
either realized by, or identical to, microphysical properties. But given the 
nature of the realization relation, and identity, we can consequently see 
that this implies all properties have causal powers such that the instantia-
tion of microphysical properties suffices for individuals having such pow-
ers. We can thus see that Peacocke is correct that physicalism entails a view 
that is monopolistic in a certain sense, and we shall later see that it is very 
important how strong a thesis one takes this 'monopoly' to imply. But, for 
our present purposes, it is enough to note that PHY entails that the "causal 
nexus" of the natural world is exhausted by events whose properties have 
causal powers which never 'dangle' outside of the web of microphysical 
powers. When PHY is true, as the evidence outlined earlier makes plausi-
ble, there are thus no microphysically unrealized forces or other properties 
whose causal powers are such that instantiation of microphysical proper-
ties does not suffice for individuals having such properties and powers. 
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We can sharpen this latter point into an argument that illuminates the 
implications of PHY still further. The type of argument I have in mind can 
be framed in a number of ways, but here let me use a simple version cen-
tering around the crude notion of a 'force' as a property which is basically 
an 'influence to change the motions of masses'. Obviously this notion of 
'force' is far simpler than that used in contemporary physics, since, for 
example, forces obviously bring about other microphysical effects than 
changes in the motions of masses. But the simple argument outlined below 
can apparently be altered to incorporate all such changes, although at the 
cost of simplicity of exposition, and it will serve here to outline the general 
form of the argument I wish to consider.6 
Given the simple notion of a 'force', consider some property 'F' whose 
causal efficacy is manifested in space-time in virtue of its causing, through 
its involvement in some event, the natural effect 'e'. This effect e is obvious-
ly located in the natural universe, but can we illuminate anything about the 
nature of the property F? Given PHY, we may assume the event e is, ulti-
mately, wholly composed by microphysical properties and individuals. 
Hence we can assume that e must involve a change in the motion of some 
mass (or some other change in microphysical properties). Consequently, 
when PHY is true, it appears that if F is a property whose causal efficacy is 
manifested in the natural world, then F will exert a 'force' in the natural uni-
verse of the kind outlined above. Let us assume this claim is correct, though 
as noted above it clearly needs qualifying in various ways to take account of 
all the nuances of contemporary physics. If we accept that there are only 
four fundamental forces, all microphysical, then F must be realized by, or 
identical to, the fundamental microphysical forces. Thus, if PHY is true, 
then it appears that what I shall call the 'Efficacy Thesis' is true: 
(Efficacy Thesis) All properties whose causal efficacy is manifested in 
the natural world, i.e. space-time, are realized by, or identical to, 
microphysical properties. 
The simple argument about 'forces' thus provides a more precise defense 
of Peacocke's claims about the implications of physicalism and its scien-
tific support. 
As will become apparent in the second half of the paper, the specific 
nature of the thesis supported by PHY is very important. It is thus worth-
while reflecting on the Efficacy Thesis and its character. Again we should 
mark that the truth of the Efficacy Thesis is compatible with the existence of 
non-physical individuals and properties whose causal efficacy is only mani-
fested beyond space-time - for example, a deistic God who creates space-
time yet never causally acts within it? More importantly, we should note a 
widely held thesis that is superficially similar to the Efficacy Thesis, what I 
will call the 'Completeness of Physics' (CP) (often also termed the 'Causal 
Closure of Physics') and define as follows (following Papineau (1993)): 
(CP) All microphysical events are determined, in so far as they are 
determined at all, by prior microphysical events and the laws of 
physics. 
8 Faith and Philosophy 
It might be argued that our simple argument actually supports CP because 
there is no real difference between the Efficacy Thesis and CPo However, I 
want to mark that shortly, in Part 2, I will present arguments that show 
that there are very important differences between CP and the Efficacy 
Thesis. In fact I will argue that these theses have different implications for 
the very possibility of causally efficacious realized properties in a physical-
ist universe. For the moment, however, I shall simply focus upon drawing 
out the implications of the Efficacy Thesis, since we can now see that it ini-
tially brings good news for panentheism. 
Physicalism implies that all the properties whose causal efficacy is mani-
fested in the natural world are either realized by, or identical to, microphys-
ical properties. Therefore, if physicalism is true and a providential God 
exists, then all the properties in virtue of which God causally acts in the nat-
ural world will be realized by, or identical to, microphysical properties. 
Furthermore, given the scientific support for PHY, any account of divine 
action that seeks to be fully compatible with the sciences must seek compat-
ibility with physicalism. Thus, any account of divine action seeking to be 
fully compatible with the sciences must also apparently take the properties 
of God whose causal efficacy is manifested in space-time to be microphysi-
cally realized. The good news is consequently that anyone who accepts the 
existence of a providential God and the truth of physicalism, as well as 
those who seek scientifically compatible accounts of divine action, must 
plausibly adopt what I earlier dubbed 'physicalist panentheism'. 
The latter position is what we might term a 'minimal' form of physical-
ist panentheism, since it only takes certain properties of God to be com-
posed by natural properties. However, one might argue that physicalism 
can establish a more encompassing position if we reflect upon the implica-
tions that realization relations between properties may have for the indi-
viduals that instantiate them. To illustrate this kind of argument, let us 
briefly consider a thesis about this issue: 
(Constituent Principle) An instance of a property X (either on its own 
or in combination with instances of other properties) is a realizer of 
an instance of a property Y instantiated in an individual s only if this 
instance of X is either instantiated in s or in an individual that is a 
constituent of S. 
The Principle basically implies that a property instance can realize another 
property instance only if the realizing property is instantiated in the same 
individual, s, as the realized property, or in one of s's constituents. 
It appears the usual exemplars of realization relations support the 
Principle. Consider the famous examples of combinations of microphysical 
properties that realize an instance of the property of being a carburetor or 
the property of being a Coke machine. In both cases it appears that all the 
realizing microphysical properties are instantiated in microphysical indi-
viduals that are constituents of the complex individuals instantiating the 
property of being a carburetor or the property of being a Coke machine. 
Obviously the Principle needs far more support before we would be justi-
fied in accepting it, but it does appear promising. 
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We should therefore note that the Principle allows us to leverage our 
knowledge about realization relations between properties to infer conclu-
sions about the constitution relations holding between the individuals in 
which realized, and realizer, properties are instantiated. The Principle can 
thus be used in combination with the claim that those of God's properties 
whose causal efficacy is manifested in the natural world are realized by, or 
identical to, microphysical properties. The conclusion is that those 'parts', 
or 'constituents', of God that instantiate properties which are causally 
active in the natural world are themselves constituted by, or identical to, 
microphysical individuals. These further arguments, building upon the 
Efficacy Thesis, thus support what we may term 'strong' physicalist panen-
theism - the position that both those of God's properties which are causally 
active in the natural world, and the 'parts' or 'constituents' of God instanti-
ating them, are microphysically composed. However, it remains to be 
shown that we should accept the Principle. Thus it remains unclear 
whether a commitment to PHY should be accompanied by acceptance of 
strong physicalist panentheism. Nonetheless, such arguments may not be 
too far over the metaphysical horizon. 
I have now argued that physicalism entails some form of physicalist 
panentheism about a providential God and it should be emphasized that 
such a position is a very specific kind of panentheism. In Part 2, I will con-
sider whether there are differences between this and other versions of 
panentheism recently offered as accOlmts of divine action. But, in conclud-
ing this section, I want to briefly consider two obvious theological concerns 
about this specific type of position. It bears emphasis that physicalist 
panentheism, of either variety, is a skeletal metaphysics of God's nature 
that may be given a variety of richer theological overlays. These views 
range from more traditional panentheist accounts under which God's 
nature goes beyond those 'parts' composed by natural entities, as well as 
more radical positions that take God to be 'embodied' in the natural world 
and possibly even to be wholly composed by natural entities.8 I will not 
examine the implications of physicalist panentheism under each of the 
metaphysical and theological variations. Rather I will sketch answers that 
might be given by a defender of the simplest of these positions - a panen-
theist holding merely that those of God's properties that are causally active 
in the natural world are microphysically realized. 
The first concern is whether we can make sense of how God can be the 
creator of the natural universe if the deity is in fact partially composed by 
elements of the natural universe. Most panentheists take God to be passible 
and a ready answer is thus available to this question. Under such a dynam-
ic view, one might argue that God does not merely create the natural 
world, but creates this world so that God now has new properties that are 
realized by, or identical to, microphysical properties. After creating the nat-
ural universe, God thus has a different form, possibly still changing, which 
now includes properties that are naturally composed. Such a picture is 
apparently coherent and provides the physicalist panentheist with one 
way she may explain how even though God creates the natural world at 
some point the creator has properties which are realized by the natural 
properties so created.9 
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The latter picture apparently has no intractable theological difficulty 
once God is taken to be passible, but a second question appears to pose 
tougher problems. Initially, it may appear that physicalist panentheism can 
be a position which takes the natural world to be the 'body' of God and 
those 'parts' beyond space-time to constitute God's 'psychological' nature 
or 'mind'. But we must note that if it is correct that physicalism entails the 
Efficacy Thesis, then when PHY is true any property of God whose causal 
efficacy is manifested, directly or indirectly, in space-time must be micro-
physically composed. That is, if one property of God has an effect on anoth-
er property of God that ultimately results in a causal effect in the natural 
world, then the Efficacy Thesis plausibly implies that both properties of 
God must be microphysically composed. There is no insulation from micro-
physical composition for any property of God whose causal efficacy is man-
ifested in the natural world. Our second theological question is consequent-
ly whether one can preserve a conception of God as a personal being under 
physicalist panentheism. For in taking the causally efficacious properties of 
God to be microphysically realized will these properties themselves not be, 
in a crucial sense, mere 'dumb' matter? The looming concern is whether 
God's causal interactions in the natural world must thus be akin to 'reflexes' 
caused by the deity's 'bodily' properties, rather than 'actions' produced by 
God's 'psychological' properties. The latter points raise the specter that 
physicalist panentheism must be a peculiar deistic position where there is a 
personal God who never acts within the natural world, although this deity 
has 'bodily parts' whose 'reflexes' do have causal effects in nature. 
This second theological concern appears to rest upon a philosophically 
contentious assumption, namely that microphysically realized properties 
cannot be, in any sense, psychological. Two points ought to be stressed in 
response. First, we must follow many participants in the debate on divine 
action in paying heed to Austin Farrer's (1967) point that ultimately God's 
precise nature is mysterious to us, and beyond our comprehension; for 
example with regard to divine 'psychology', properties and the character 
of the relation between God and His or Her properties, amongst other 
issues. (Thus the plethora of scare quotes used to mark the metaphorical 
application of our concepts to God). Given this mystery, one may be dubi-
ous that we can know that if some property of God is microphysically real-
ized, then this property cannot be 'psychological'. 
Second, and perhaps more telling, is the fact that recent work in the phi-
losophy of mind has produced a number of plausible accounts about how 
various types of psychological properties may be microphysically realized. 
In fact, the concept of 'realization' derives from philosophical work on 
such accounts. For example, so-called 'functionalist' theories argue that 
mental properties, such as believing that grass is green, are simply proper-
ties individuated by the causal roles that they play in large systems of 
causally interconnected properties, causal inputs and causal outputs. lO 
Under such a view it is argued that a combination of microphysical proper-
ties can dearly realize a mental property so long as this combination plays 
the requisite causal role. Functionalism therefore apparently provides good 
reasons to believe that psychological properties, whether human or divine, 
can be microphysically realized. 
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In addition, it appears that functionalism offers still more specific sup-
port for the possibility of 'psychological' properties of a personal God that 
are microphysically realized. For it has been widely noted that an implica-
tion of functionalist views is that any physical system that plays the speci-
fied causal roles will realize mental properties. Infamously, it has been 
argued that even systems such as a vast array of causally interacting tin 
cans on a beach might have mental properties (see Lycan (1987) for a sur-
vey)! Such examples are often used to argue that functionalism makes it 
too easy for physical systems to have mentality, leading to mental proper-
ties floating around outside humans and other organisms!, and these cases 
are thus taken to be problematic. But in the context of physicalist panenthe-
ism this implication of functionalism may help the panentheist and, in 
tum, this version of theism may ameliorate the difficulties of functional-
ism. As we have seen, functionalism is helpful to the panentheist by allow-
ing the possibility, whose precise details must be mysterious to us, that the 
properties of God that are microphysical realized may be 'psychological' in 
nature, staving off the regress of physicalist panentheism into the peculiar 
deism noted. In the other direction, physicalist panentheism's implication 
that microphysical properties will realize 'psychological' properties of a 
personal, but ultimately mysterious, God can greatly help the functionalist. 
For if this version of theism is correct, then it is to be expected both: (a) that 
there will be systems of microphysical properties outside of humans, and 
other organisms, that realize mental properties. And (b) that the ultimate 
nature of these systems, and the realization relations they ground, will be 
mysterious. For such mental properties will include properties of God 
under physicalist panentheism and functionalism will not so clearly make 
instantiation of mental properties too widespread. 
To conclude, I have argued there are resources available for answering 
both of the obvious theological concerns about physicalist panentheism. 
That answers to these theological concerns are available is fortunate. For 
the main conclusion of this section has been that physicalism, and its sup-
porting scientific evidence, make it plausible that if there is a God who acts 
in the natural world, then physicalist panentheism is true. And this is 
regardless of whether such a position is compatible with the existence of a 
personal God who created the natural world. 
2. Physicalism and the Bad News about Divine Action. 
As I noted earlier, just as we take persons to cause certain actions in 
virtue of their mental properties, so a providential God is taken to be 
causally responsible for certain effects in the natural world in virtue of His 
or Her 'psychological' properties. When these commitments are combined 
with PHY, we now see that one is committed to the familiar thesis which I 
will call 'Higher Causal Efficacy' (HCE): 
(HCE) There are causally efficacious higher level properties instanti-
ated in individuals located in space-time. 
Physicalist panentheism is based upon Higher Causal Efficacy, since it takes 
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God to be causally responsible for certain effects in virtue of this being's 
mental properties which are microphysically realized. Since a property is 
causally efficacious only when it actually contributes causal powers to an 
individual, we therefore see that physicalist panentheism implies that there 
are realized properties that contribute causal powers to individuals. But, 
given these latter commitments, physicalism apparently brings some bad 
news for panentheists. For philosophers have recently argued there are 
profound metaphysical problems about how both PHY and HCE could be 
true together. To illuminate how these problems play out I will first give a 
general outline and then show how they apply in the case of divine action. 
Recall that PHY implies that all properties are realized by, or identical 
to, microphysical properties. As the Efficacy Thesis summarizes, there are 
no 'spooky' dualistic entities, such as entelechies or vital forces, acting out-
side the 1/ causal nexus" comprised by the microphysical web of properties 
and powers. Given this, a critic may argue that it is ontologically profligate 
to take any property to contribute causal powers and hence to be causally 
efficacious in addition to microphysical properties and relations. For the 
critic points out that given the nature of the realization relation, and identi-
ty, we can account for all the causal powers of individuals simply using the 
contributions of powers by the microphysical properties of these individu-
als, or their constituents, rather than also as contributions from higher level 
properties. But we cannot account for all causal powers of individuals sim-
ply as contributions by higher level properties. If we assume that the 
causal powers of individuals are not overdetermined, then appealing to 
Occam's Razor the critic argues that we should accept the existence of no 
more casually efficacious properties than we need to account for the causal 
powers of individuals. She thus concludes that this simple argument 
implies that if PHY is true, then we should only accept that microphysical 
properties are causally efficacious and hence should take HCE to be false. 
Let us call this the' Argument from Realization' (AR), since it uses the 
nature of the realization relation, and the truth of PHY, to argue we should 
not take higher level properties to be causally efficaciousY 
As a side-point, we should mark that the same type of argument is easily 
constructed for so-called 'structural', and other higher level, properties that 
are identical to combinations of microphysical properties. For such struc-
tural properties are plausibly individuated by causal powers that are also 
had in virtue of the causal powers contributed by microphysical proper-
ties.'2 To better illustrate the general nature of AR let us examine a detailed 
example focussed upon realization, but where there is also a higher level 
property identical to some combination of microphysical properties. 
Consider a case where a combination of microphysical properties and 
relations, 'PI', 'P2', 'P3', ... etc. is instantiated in microphysical individuals 
'al'-'an' which themselves constitute a higher level individual's'. I will 
term the latter, structural property 'COMBO' to mark that it is a higher 
level property identical to a combination of microphysical individuals, prop-
erties and relations. If we take 'CI', 'Ci, 'C3', ... etc., to be the causal pow-
ers individuating PI, P2, P3 ... etc. respectively, then the causal powers 
individuating COMBO, 'Ccom', are apparently the powers resulting from 
CI, C2, C3··· etc together and had by s. That is, the powers that PI, P2, 
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P3 ... etc. together suffice for s to have. Finally, let us assume that COMBO 
realizes some property 'G' uniquely individuated by causal powers 'Cc'. 
For example, let us simply assume that CG is a subset of Ccom (though 
this is not necessary for realization), thus COMBO is not identical to G, but 
COMBO's powers suffice for G's instantiation. 
Should we take either the instances of G or COMBO to be causally effi-
cacious in such a case? The proponent of AR will argue that we should not. 
For neither G or COMBO is a fundamental microphysical property or rela-
tion. And AR implies we should not take anything more than the 'compo-
nent' microphysical properties and relations to be causally efficacious, for 
al-an instantiating their microphysical properties and relations alone suf-
fices to account for all the causal powers of these individuals and s. In this 
case there is no need to take either the causal powers Ccom' or its subset 
CG, to pick out causally efficacious properties in addition to PI, P2, P3 ... 
etc. For this would again be ontologically profligate - a case of "double-
counting", to use David Lewis' phrase, the causally efficacious properties. 
All the causal powers of the individuals in this case can be accounted for 
simply by taking PI-Pn to contribute causal powers. Thus, the proponent 
of AR concludes that neither realized properties such as G, nor so-called 
structural properties such as COMBO that are identical to combinations of 
microphysical properties, should be taken to be causally efficacious. 
The metaphysical problems posed by AR are obviously quite general 
and the following dilemma serves to illuminate the difficulties raised for 
physicalist panentheism. On one hand, if one accepts the truth of physical-
ism, then one's account of divine action will be fully compatible with the 
findings of the sciences. But AR shows that such a view leaves no room 
for divine action, since it shows that only the properties of microphysics 
will be causally efficacious and not any of the properties they realize, 
whether instantiated by a divine being or otherwise! Yet, on the other 
hand, if one accepts that God does act in the world, then one's account 
cannot be compatible with PHY and hence the sciences. For God must 
apparently have a 'dualistic', physically unrealized property that is 
causally efficacious in the natural world in virtue of causal powers 'dan-
gling' outside the "causal nexus" of microphysical powers identified by 
the sciences. Either way, one is left without an account of divine action 
that is fully compatible with physicalism and the sciences! 
Such metaphysical problems have been addressed in the recent debate 
over divine action by researchers offering panentheist accounts. Perhaps 
the two most prominent panentheists in this debate have been the philoso-
pher Philip Clayton and, as noted earlier, Arthur Peacocke. It will be use-
ful to examine each of their accounts, for this will serve to better illuminate 
the character of physicalist panentheism and also the nature of the general 
metaphysical problems for divine action that physicalism brings in its 
wake. I will argue that Clayton's position, although panentheist, is not a 
physicalist panentheism and I will suggest that Peacocke's position may be, 
depending upon his answer to a crucial metaphysical question. 
Furthermore, I will argue that, on deeper inspection, Clayton's and 
Peacocke's positions are both unsuccessful in answering AR. 
In his (1997), Philip Clayton offers an account of divine action based 
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upon the existence of "emergent" properties which he argues are not 
examples of non-physical substances, but are fundamental, non-physical 
propertiesY Clayton argues that such non-physical properties make a form 
of "downward causation" possible by which a human or divine agent can 
have a causal impact in the natural world. And Clayton consequently con-
eludes that: 
... theology does not need to embrace either a radical dualism of 
mind/ soul and body or the physicalism that is widespread among 
scientists and philosophers today. The theory of emergent properties 
forms an attractive via media between these two poles of the discus-
sion. (Clayton (1997), p.247. Original emphasis.) 
Clayton's "emergent" properties provide a kind of response to AR. Such 
properties are not microphysically realized and hence allow for divine (or 
human) action, and downward causation. For these properties are not in 
the microphysical web of properties and there is consequently no paradox 
about how they could be causally efficacious, rather than some micro-
physical realizer. 
Unfortunately, Clayton's position preserves Higher Causal Efficacy only 
by abandoning physicalism, for it accepts the existence of fundamental, i.e. 
unrealized, non-physical properties and adopts a form of dualism less rad-
ical than traditional substance dualism, but still at odds with the scientific 
findings supporting PHY. Clayton's account of divine action is conse-
quently not fully compatible with the sciences. In pressing this point, I am 
leveling against Clayton the same criticism (Clayton (1997), p.219) that he 
makes to Nancey Murphy (1995). Murphy bases her account of divine 
agency around fundamental, non-physical forces that allow God to act at 
the quantum level of events. Clayton concedes that Murphy's position, and 
her careful interpretation of quantum physics, answers the question "Is 
divine agency possible?". But Clayton furthers objects that Murphy has not 
successfully answered the question "Is divine agency plausible?". For he 
argues that, given the scientific evidence, scientists will baulk at the idea of 
further fundamental, and non-physical, forces. I contend that Clayton's 
theory also fails to successfully answer the question "Is divine agency plau-
sible?", for his own account is committed to fundamental, causally effica-
cious non-physical properties. Events instantiating such properties will 
obviously have microphysical effects in virtue of them and application of 
the argument based upon the simple notion of 'force' used in Part 1 easily 
serves to highlight Clayton's consequent commitment to fundamental, 
non-physical forces. His account thus fails to be scientifically compatible 
because it flies in the face of the scientific evidence for physicalism.14 
Let us turn to the other prominent panentheist in the recent debate over 
divine action. Is Arthur Peacocke a physicalist panentheist? And does he 
offer an answer to AR? Peacocke is sensitive to the scientific evidence sup-
porting physicalism and this sensitivity is a driving force behind his 
account of divine agency. Like Clayton, Peacocke postulates "emergent" 
properties and "downward causation", terming his position "Emergentist 
Monism". But these notions apparently take a very different form in 
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Peacocke's account, since he makes clear that his type of "emergent" prop-
erty is intended to be microphysically composed. Interestingly, at the core 
of Peacocke's position are a number of metaphysical ideas that may be 
interpreted as comprising a response to AR. In his earliest work (Peacocke 
(1990», Peacocke sought to explain how a composite could be causally effi-
cacious using the notion of "downward causation". But the idea that a 
composite exerts a causal influence upon its own parts is problematic, for 
causal relations only hold between wholly distinct entities. Thus if the com-
posites Peacocke postulates did causally interact with their parts in a 
"downward" fashion, then these composites would apparently have prop-
erties that are wholly distinct from the microphysical properties of their 
components. Such properties would not therefore be microphysically real-
ized and physicalism would be apparently be false! 
Peacocke has gradually become sensitive to the problems surrounding 
"downward causation" of this type and in his more recent work he has 
instead adopted the notions of "whole-part constraint" (1995, Fn.l) and 
finally "whole-part influence" (1999, Fn.l). This latter idea apparently 
promises an answer about how a composed entity, a whole, could still be 
causal in the world even though it is fully composed by parts. However, 
before we examine this idea further, we must be careful to note that there 
are two possible interpretations of Peacocke's position, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly given the emphasis he places upon the ultimate mystery of God's 
nature. Peacocke argues that the natural world is 'in' God, but this may be 
interpreted in weaker and stronger fashions. On the weaker reading, which 
Peacocke himself apparently favors, the 'in' merely implies a spatial relation 
and no further compositional relation (Peacocke (Personal communica-
tion». Thus the world is in God just as a person may be in the Empire State 
Building, though clearly neither the person or the world is a part of the enti-
ty they are 'in'. (Peacocke (1999)'s favored metaphor for the relation, Fn.78, 
follows Augustine's idea of the natural world as a sponge floating in God's 
sea). As a result, the weaker reading does not take the causally efficacious 
properties of God to be realized by microphysical, or any other, properties 
instantiated by individuals located in the natural world. On the stronger 
reading, the manner in which the natural world is 'in' God is taken to imply 
a compositional relation where the properties of God are realized by prop-
erties instantiated in the natural world, thus leaving Peacocke's position as a 
full-blown instance of physicalist panentheism. (For reasons related to the 
theological concerns examined at the end of Part 1, Peacocke (Personal com-
munication) is wary of accepting this latter form of panentheism). Though 
they differ in exegetical accuracy, the positions resulting from these inter-
pretations are both interesting and I want to examine how each fares as an 
account of divine action in a physicalist world. 
With regard to Peacocke's intended position, where the natural world is 
merely spatially within God in some metaphorical sense, we can see that 
the account faces similar problems to Clayton's position. For on such a 
view, the causally efficacious properties of God will not be realized by 
microphysical properties. But, once again, the simple argument about 
forces, offered in Part 1, suffices to illuminate the consequent difficulties. 
For let us assume God acts upon the natural world in virtue of some prop-
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erty 'D' that effects some change in either the whole of the natural uni-
verse, considered as a "system-of-systems" as Peacocke puts it, or in some 
portion of it. Let us call this latter effect of God 'e'. Given the evidence for 
PHY, we may assume that the event e involves a change in the motion of 
some mass (or some other change in microphysical properties, but as noted 
earlier I leave these considerations to one side for simplicity's sake). 
Consequently, it appears that if God acts in the natural world in virtue of 
D, then the latter property would have to change the motions of masses 
and hence exert a 'force' in the natural universe, in the sense outlined in 
Part 1. It appears we have two alternatives with regard to this divine 'force' 
D. On one hand, we can follow Clayton and accept a version of dualism, 
accepting that D is a fundamental, non-physical force flying in the face of 
the scientific evidence. Whilst on the other hand, we can accept the scien-
tific evidence that there are only four fundamental forces, all microphysi-
cal, and conclude that D must be realized by such fundamental physical 
forces. On this second option, one accepts that those of God's properties 
that are causally active in the natural world are microphysically realized. 
But we must thus abandon the claim that God is only spatially related to 
the natural world, for at least some of God's properties will be realized by 
microphysical properties. 
It appears that the position that a God who acts in the natural world is 
merely spatially, but not compositionally, related to the natural world 
either collapses into a dualistic position, or must be re-interpreted as an 
instance of physicalist panentheism. Though Peacocke is wary of commit-
ting himself to a full-blown physicalist panentheism, I want to briefly re-
interpret his account as a version of this latter position using an alternative 
understanding of "part-whole" influence. I shall ultimately suggest that his 
re-interpreted position also fails, but I want to consider this kind of view 
because I will later suggest that the general kind has promise as a response 
toAR.15 
On the reading I have in mind, we would re-interpret Peacocke as using 
what he calls a "flow of information" to explain how microphysically com-
posed properties may exert what he terms a "whole-part influence" to 
slightly alter their microphysical components contributions of causal pow-
ers. Crucially, this alteration would be a 'quantitative' rather than a 'quali-
tative' change at the microphysical level - it would be slight enough that 
the properties would still contribute the vast preponderance of causal 
powers they contribute elsewhere. Thus the same fundamental forces 
would plausibly still exist and no new ontologically fundamental forces 
would have been brought into existence. But the existing fundamental 
physical forces would have their 'quantities', their contributions of causal 
powers, slightly altered in some brute way by realizing certain higher level 
property. As a result, it might be argued that the relevant higher level 
properties could be causally efficacious through their partial determination 
of the causal powers contributed by the existing microphysical forces, 
rather than through exerting some new, 'spooky', non-physical force. 
Through this partial determination of the existing microphysical properties 
Peacocke could thus be re-interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as arguing that 
higher level properties can be causally efficacious in themselves, but with-
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out adding to the fundamental ontology of the universe and violating PHY. 
Higher level properties are necessary to account for the contribution of 
causal powers, supporting the truth of HCE, yet all causal powers are 
nonetheless powers of microphysical properties, thus making it plausible 
such higher level properties are realized and supporting the claim that 
PHY is also true. 
Under the framework I am using to re-interpret Peacocke, the resulting 
view may thus be charitably taken to be seeking to show that HCE can be 
true when physicalism holds; and hence that a panentheist God of the 
physicalist variety can be causally efficacious. Unfortunately, we can 
quickly see that even under this reading the same metaphysical problems 
arise once more for Peacocke's account, since he repeatedly states that any 
flow of information is mediated by the transfer of energy (peacocke (1999), 
p.22S and 229). If we consider one of the realized properties, 'H', in virtue 
of which God, or some other "whole", exerts a "whole-part influence", 
then we have two interpretive alternatives. On one side, if the energy 
transferred when information flows from H to its realizers is the energy of 
these microphysical realizers, then physicalism remains true. But then AR 
implies we should only accept that the microphysical properties are causal-
ly efficacious. For their energy is responsible for the information flow and 
what appeared to be a "whole-part influence" of the realized property H. 
Thus PHY would be true, but HCE would not. Under the other alternative, 
if the energy transferred when information flows is energy had by H but 
not by its microphysical realizers, then HCE would be true. For it would 
be in virtue of H that some event caused certain microphysical events, 
rather than solely in virtue of H's microphysical realizers. Yet, as a conse-
quence, H and its energy would also not be microphysically realized. 
Basically, H would comprise a fundamental, non-physical form of energy 
and though HCE might hold true, PHY would not. Thus Peacocke's idea of 
"whole-part influence" still fails to answer AR even under the broached 
physicalist panentheist re-interpretation. 
Through our discussion of Clayton and Peacocke, we have seen that AR 
poses formidable difficulties both for physicalist panentheist accounts of 
divine action and, consequently, for any account of divine action which 
seeks to be fully scientifically compatible. Although physicalism implies 
that God's nature must accord with physicalist panentheism, it also 
appears that physicalism provides a prima facie reason to believe that such 
a God could not act in the world! Given these profound metaphysical 
problems, should we abandon physicalist panentheism? In evaluating this 
question two points stand out. First, AR does not merely undermine the 
causal efficacy of the properties of a physicalist panentheist deity, but 
undermines the causal efficacy of all higher level properties! Accepting AR 
will thus not merely undermine divine agency, but also human agency and 
the causal efficacy of a swathe of other properties. We thus have quite gen-
eral reasons why we should not yield to AR. Second, if we take AR to be 
unanswerable and abandon the search for a position under which both 
PHY and HCE are true, then we are abandoning the search for an account 
of divine action that may be fully compatible with the sciences. For we 
would be admitting that an account of divine action cannot be compatible 
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with physicalism and all the scientific evidence supporting it.16 Again, this 
provides good reason to contest AR. 
Rather than admit defeat in either of these respects, I contend that the-
ists should continue to explore metaphysical responses to AR and associat-
ed accounts of divine action. Given this stance, by reflecting upon what it 
would take to successfully respond to AR we can now appreciate the 
importance of the differences between the Completeness of Physics, and 
the Efficacy Thesis, which I noted in Part 1. What would suffice to block 
AR? Apparently a metaphysical, rather than epistemic, reason why instan-
tiation of some higher level property is, or even could be, necessary to 
account for the causal powers of individuals when PHY is true. I call this 
the 'Metaphysical Condition', since it is the demand for a metaphysical rea-
son whose specific nature I leave open for the obvious reason that the very 
possibility of such a reason is at issue. However, if the Condition is satis-
fied, then a crucial premise of AR is undermined, namely that instantiation 
of microphysical properties alone suffices to account for all the powers of 
individuals when PHY holds. 
We can now see that commitment to CP considerably deepens the prob-
lems posed by AR. Satisfying the Metaphysical Condition entails that there 
is a metaphysical reason why instantiation of some higher level property 
'H' is necessary to account for some causal power 'C' of some individual. 
But if there were a causal power of the relevant kind, then it is plausible that 
H will be a necessary part of the cause of some microphysical event. (Again 
assuming the non-existence of causal power overdetermination). For one 
would need to posit the instantiation of H in order to accOlmt both for the 
individual having C and any microphysical event that is caused in virtue of 
the individual, and any event it composes, having C. Consequently, the 
microphysical would not be causally complete, for not all microphysical 
events would be determined, in so far as they are determined at all, by prior 
microphysical events. Though quick, this shows, I suggest, that the truth of 
CP is incompatible with satisfaction of the Metaphysical Condition. This 
inconsistency obviously poses a further substantive problem for the many 
physicalists who accept CP in addition to PHY. 
If CP raises such grave problems, does commitment to the Efficacy Thesis 
alone leave physicalists any better situated? It appears that it may well do so 
and we can see this by returning to the core idea I earlier used in re-interpret-
ing Peacocke's position. To reprise, and stripping away Peacocke's commit-
ments to transfer of information or energy etc., the central idea was that 
higher level properties might partially determine the causal powers con-
tributed by some of their microphysical realizers. Consequently, I suggested 
that higher level properties could be causally efficacious tl1fough their deter-
mination of the natures of the existing microphysical forces, rather than 
tl1rough exerting some new, 'spooky', non-physical force. For higher level 
properties would be necessary to account for the contribution of causal pow-
ers to individuals by microphysical properties, supporting the truth of HCE. 
Yet all causal powers would nonetheless be powers of microphysical proper-
ties, thus making it plausible such higher level properties are realized and 
supporting the claim that PHY is true. In such a scenario, there consequently 
appears to be a chance that the Metaphysical Condition would be satisfied. 
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Furthermore, although CP would be false for the reasons noted above, the 
Efficacy Thesis would arguably still be true, since all higher level properties 
would be microphysically realized. It thus appears that the Efficacy Thesis 
leaves a chink of metaphysical space, through its more permissive implica-
tions about the entities that can be determinative, where the determinative 
'monopoly' implied by CP leaves none. 
It obviously remains to be shown that the Efficacy Thesis allows both 
HCE and PHY to be true together. However, I hope that I have shown that 
the Efficacy Thesis is importantly different from CP; and also begun to illu-
minate one type of possible response to AR this may allow. I should note 
that in their focus upon so-called 'emergent' properties, and associated ideas 
such as "part-whole influence", Clayton and especially Peacocke apparently 
point the way to just this type of promising metaphysical approach to AR. 
Ultimately, I have argued that their positions conflict with the truth of physi-
calism, but their underlying ideas and the positions of earlier 'emergentists' 
are clearly worth further investigation. Before theists abandon accounts of 
divine action that are fully compatible with scientific findings I contend that 
they ought to explore whether such 'emergentist' frameworks help in 
answering AR and I have pursued this project at length elsewhereY In 
addition, many contemporary philosophers have begun to offer a range of 
other responses to AR that do not rely upon 'emergentist' ideas (see, for 
example, Jackson (1995), Kim (1998) and Shoemaker (2001), amongst others). 
Whether these responses succeed is also a highly contentious issue, and still 
more so if one pays careful attention to the noted implications of CP which is 
endorsed by many of these writers. Nonetheless, it also behooves theists to 
fully explore such accounts before they conclude that divine action is not 
fully compatible with the scientific view of the natural world. 
To conclude, I have argued here that the goods news for panentheists is 
that Peacocke is correct that the truth of physicalism, and its supporting 
scientific evidence, implies that those properties of God whose causal effi-
cacy is manifested in the natural world are realized by microphysical prop-
erties. But the bad news that I have argued that physicalism brings in its 
wake is that such a panentheist position faces profound metaphysical 
problems. For the Argument from Realization implies that if we accept 
PHY, then we ought to reject HCE. Panentheists of the physicalist persua-
sion must answer this general metaphysical argument and so too must 
anyone seeking an account of God's action that is fully compatible with the 
sciences. As noted above, I contend that Peacocke and Clayton were right 
to pursue 'emergentist' positions, albeit of an overly dualistic kind, for 
such views promise help with the AR. Elsewhere I have offered a meta-
physical defense of an 'emergentist' account of how Higher Causal Efficacy 
and physicalism may both be true; and argued that it vindicates physicalist 
panentheist approaches to divine action. IS However, my conclusions here 
are that until some answer to AR is successfully provided we must accept 
that the existence of a providential God is incompatible with the truth of 
physicalism. And we must go without a view of God's action that may be 
fully compatible with the sciencesY' 
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NOTES 
1. For examples, see Clayton (1997), Gregerson (1998), Murphy (1995), 
Peacocke (1990), (1995) and (Forthcoming), and Polkinghorne (1993) and 
(1995), as well as many of the papers in Tracy (1994). In addition, in a com-
bined project between the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology 
and the Natural Sciences, there have been a series of conferences and volumes 
on the compatibility of various scientific areas for divine action, see for exam-
ple Russell et al (1993) and (1995), amongst others. 
2. See Peacocke (1990), (1995) and, especially, (Forthcoming). 
3. See Elkana (1974) and Haraway (1976) for surveys of the variety of sci-
entists committed to special forces at this time. 
4. We could tighten the definition further by limiting it to properties indi-
viduated by their causal powers. In this way one might avoid concerns that, for 
example, some individual located in space-time instantiates some causally 
inert property. Having noted this type of amendment, I will leave it to one 
side. I should also note that there are substantive questions about defining the 
key notion of a 'microphysical' property. Elsewhere I have argued that such 
problems can be overcome (see Crook and Gillett (2001)). 
5. This account is defended in Gillett (Forthcoming-a) and (Unpublished-
c). The definition is slightly more complex than the usual definitions of realiza-
tion, but this is needed if one is to respect the different individuals in which 
realized properties and their realizers may be instantiated, and to accommo-
date the fact that such properties may share no causal powers. The definition 
also has the feature, which we will see below is a virtue, of covering cases of 
realization where the higher level property is "structural". 
6. Consider, for instance, the same argument based around the notion of 
'force' defined as the influence to bring about microphysical changes of types 
'AI', 'A2', ... 'An', where the A's represent all the types of microphysical 
changes effected by forces. It appears the argument will still be valid if it uses 
this wider notion. 
7. Deism is compatible with the Efficacy Thesis. But is the Thesis compati-
ble with a position that takes God to causally act in the natural world through 
natural 'surrogates' that do not form any 'part' of God? The primary example 
of such accounts are so-called 'two causes' views of divine action, such as 
Wiles (1986), under which natural events are argued to have both a natural 
cause and also a divine cause, whether as a 'sustaining' cause or some other 
form of causation. I will not consider such accounts, since there are plausible 
objections to their truth. For example, see Thomas Tracey's critique in the intro-
duction to his (1994) and his contribution to Russell et al. (1995). (Furthermore, 
the argument offered in Part 1 may apparently be applied to establish that, 
assuming PHY, such accounts must devolve into physicalist panentheism or 
contradiction). 
8. See Peacocke (1990) and (1999) for the more traditional form of panen-
theism where God's nature exceeds the natural universe. For more radical 
forms of panentheism, closer to physicalist panentheism, see McFague (1993), 
and Jantzen (1984) which have 'embodiment' accounts of God's relation to the 
natural world. See also the work of Charles Hartshorne who espouses a posi-
tion similar to physicalist panentheism. (Thanks to Edgar Towne for the latter 
point). 
9. This type of explanation can easily be extended to individuals as well as 
properties in order to defend strong physicalist panentheism. 
10. See Putnam (1967) and Lycan (1987), for seminal and recent functional-
ist accounts. 
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11. The philosopher Jaegwon Kim has perhaps done the most to illuminate 
the nature of these problems in a series of papers and books, see for example 
Kim (1993), (1997) and (1998). Kim's arguments are primarily focussed on the 
causal efficacy of realized properties and similar arguments, including argu-
ments directed at dispositional properties, are also found in Prior, Pargetter 
and Jackson (1982), Martin (1997) and Heil (2000), amongst others. 
12. Gillett and Rives (2001) provides a defense of the claim that the same 
style of argument is easily translated to apply to properties identical to, rather 
than realized by, combinations of microphysical properties. Gillett 
(Forthcoming-a) provides a more precise metaphysical argument for the point. 
13. Clayton accepts O'Connor's (1994) account of emergent properties 
under which they are not realized by lower level properties (Clayton (1997), 
p.248). 
14. With regard to this criticism it appears Clayton's main response 
echoes a suggestion of John Polkinghorne, for Clayton argues that the 
methodology of the sciences does not require adherence to physicalism 
(Clayton (1997), p.202-201). And hence he suggests that an account that 
conflicts with PHY is not at odds with the sciences. I fully agree with the 
point that scientific methodology does not require endorsement of PHY 
and I have offered an extended argument for just this claim elsewhere 
(Gillett (2001)). The problem for Clayton is that the methodological stric-
tures of the sciences are not the main support for PHY. As I outlined in the 
Part 1, the findings of the sciences provide a large body of evidence about 
the compositional relations that hold between entities, for example that DNA 
composes genes or certain quantum states compose particular chemical 
bonds. It is such empirical evidence that makes it so plausible that PHY is 
true, not the methodology of the sciences. Consequently, by rejecting PHY 
Clayton's account of divine agency is plausibly in conflict with the findings 
of the sciences. 
15. The re-interpretation of Peacocke uses the kind of account that Gillett 
(Unpublished-a) argues was actually espoused by Samuel Alexander's (1920) 
and which Gillett (Forthcoming-b) has defended in the contemporary debate. 
16. There are two opposed forms 'pessimistic' responses may take. The 
first says /ISo much the worse for physicalism!/I and like Clayton adopts 
some form of dualistic position, arguing that the existence of a divine (or 
human) agent shows the sciences must be incomplete in their findings about 
the world's structure. In contrast, the other says "So much the worse for 
divine (or human) agents!" and argues the sciences have shown us that our 
pre-scientific assumptions, here HCE, were mistaken once more. Such a 
position will lead either to deism, pantheism or atheism. 
17. For example, ideas about 'emergence' and the possible determinative 
role of microphysically composed higher level properties are to be found in 
Alexander (1920) and Lloyd Morgan (1923), amongst others. See Gillett 
(Unpublished-a) for a detailed explication of Alexander's position and sugges-
tions about its promise for answering AR. 
18. In Gillett (Unpublished-b) and (Forthcoming-b). For a survey of recent 
concepts of emergence as they relate to AR see Gillett (Forthcoming-c). 
19. A shorter version of this paper was read at the Gifford Conference on 
Natural Theology, the University of Aberdeen, in May 2000. I am grateful to 
the audience and my commentator Edgar Towne. Thanks also to Seth Crook, 
Brad Rives and Arthur Peacocke. Finally, I am grateful to the editor, and four 
anonymous referees, whose helpful comments improved the paper. 
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